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It is somewhat unusual to begin the treatment of a subject
with a warning against attaching too much importance to
it; but in the case of economics, such an injunction is quite anc
as much needed as explanation and emphasis of the import- deciue
those ance it really has. It is characteristic of the age in which we
- d live to think too much in terms of economics, to see things
oes
too predominantly in their economic aspect... .Thereis eve.
no more important prerequisite to clear thinking in regard
to economics itself than is recognition of its limited place term








Malthus, in essays published in 1798 and 1830, and the classical econo- Wi
mists combined a very simple model of family decision making— funda
procreation without bound except possibly by "a foresight of the difficult- and C
ies attending the rearing of a family. ..andthe actual distresses of (196l
some of the lower classes, by which they are disabled from giving the work
proper food and attention to their children" (Malthus 1970, p. 89)— Mitc
with an equally simple model of the operation of the economy. According Art
to the latter, a high level of capital accumulation induced by a high level sped
of profits—representing the difference between output and the rent of theoi
land (natural resources) and wages—permitted a continual increase in of th
output and population, albeit at the cost of resort to land of increasingly hum
relal
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S2ooHOUSEHOLD AND ECONOMY S2o1
9W poorerquality; it did not, as the result of the model of family decision-
making, lead to a rising standard of living for most people. Thus, the
classical economists achieved a very simple model of economic growth
and development (Baumol 1970, pp. 13—21). Modern growth theorists in
the tradition of Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) have developed theories
of economic growth based on far more elaborate theories of the economy,
but few theories of population growth and family decision making have
gone much beyond the Malthusian model (Pitchford 1973, pp. 1—10).
Although natural-resourceconstraints may be readily incorporated
through the device of diminishing returns to scale in the variable factors
(Swan 1956, pp. 340—42), it is a constant proportional rate of population
growth, perhaps aided and abetted by exogenous technological progress,
that essentially drives the mechanism. Discussions of the optimal rates of
population growth or level of population do often attempt to integrate
an endogenously determined population in the model. But none, to my
knowledge, have examined the feedback from changes in the economy
and changes in the relative prices and costs which families face when they
decide how many children they will have and what they will invest in
those children's health, nutrition, or education, although Pitchford (1973)
does discuss the costs of and returns to population control at the macro
level.
In recent years, the recognition, crucial to the understanding of long-
term growth, that much investment which occurs in the economy is
made in human beings rather than in physical capital and that fertility
itself is shaped in important ways by economic considerations has led to
renewed interest in the economics of the household decisions. In that type
of unit, not only decisions about fertility, but also those related to in-
vestments in human capital, consumption and savings, migration, labor-
force participation, and, in a sense, marriage itself, are made.
no- With this in mind, in Section 2 I briefly and critically describe the
fundamental elements of the largely static theory of household production
tlt and choice. This theory was developed in its modern form by Gary Becker
of (1965) and others, but most of its essentials originated in the much earlier
he work of Margaret Reid (1934), and it owes a good deal to Wesley
— Mitchell'sseminal observations in his essay (1912) on "The Backward
Art of Spending Money." Section 3 concludes this paper with some
el speculations on how the "new home economics" may be integrated in a
of theory of economic growth and development through an understanding
of the way in which investment in human capital increases the value of
human time and thus changes over time the resource constraints and the
relative costs and prices which "households" face in their decisions on
the number and quality of children they attempt to produce. The
h question as to whether this constitutes a true economic explanation of the
o so-called demographic transition, and thus a revision of the Maithusian
tradition, is basically an empirical one and is left open.S2o2 JOURNALOF POLITICAL ECONOMY HOUSEH
2.The "New Home Economics": Summary and Critique
In its most unadorned form, economics is the theory of allocation of
limited resources among competing ends in order to maximize satisfactions
(or utility), subject to the constraints imposed by limitations in the
availability of the resources required to achieve those ends. Various
elaborations and accretions are necessary to accommodate this central
theoretical core to the dynamics of choices made sequentially over time
and in the presence of uncertainty regarding future constraints and future -
preferences.At several points I shall have more to say about our present
failure to reach successful accommodations in our underlying theory in
these directions, as well as about our even more important limitations as Strci
economists to cope with the whole complex of issues raised by inter- his
generational transfers, within society as an ongoing concern, and par. ical cc
ticularly within the family. althou
The first element in the new home economics is the utility function to import
be maximized. Its form and its arguments (i.e., what variables determine marke
its level) are obviously crucial in determining the choices which result (1966)
from its maximization. But whose utility function is it that is maximized yield
in connection with choices pertinent to marriage, children, consumption functi
of commodities, work and leisure, and investment in all forms of capital? Whilc
Considering the household as already formed, much of the theoretical econo
underpinning rests on what I have called elsewhere the "Chicago model"
(Nerlove 1 972b).' functi
The "Chicago utility function," if I may call it that, has several key lackir
characteristics. First, it does not involve nonmarket goods or physical corn-
modifies and purchasable services as we usually think of them in eco- how
nomics, but its arguments are abstract goods composed of a number of addit
"attributes" which must themselves be produced within the household differ
(Becker 1965; Lancaster 1966; Muth 1966). The importance of this much
characteristic of the utility function is that it leads directly to the key to
questions of household technology and the composition of different types point
of market goods and services and physical commodities, in terms of time
attributes contributing to satisfactions. This, indeed, is the point made
forcefully by Muth (1966) and recently emphasized by Michael and A
Becker (1972). Earlier (1947), Leontief pointed out that the theory of just
consumer behavior as then developed, although of great generality, mem
lacked content to the extent that it gave no clue to the types of relations decis
to be expected among different categories of goods. assul
The assumption of the existence of general categories of needs, 2
differentfrom demands for particulaY individual commodities, the h
and:
1Atthis conference, Jacob Mincer objected to this and said that the model should
reallybe called the "Morningside Heights" model; however, force of habit leads me to hasI
persistin this terminology. Mid
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but still specific enough to be clearly distinguishable from each
other,isbasic to the man-in-the-street idea of consumers'
tiori of demand. One speaks of the desire for food as existing behind
actions and separately from the particular demand for bread, apples,
in the or Lobster a la Newburg. This need for food is at the same time
arious spoken of as something clearly distinguishable from the similarly
.Cfltral general needs for clothing or, say, for shelter, each of the latter
r time also thought of asexisting separately although manifested
uture through the particular demands for one-family houses, apart-
present ment flats, or woolen suits and raincoats. [Leontief 1947, p. 371]
Ory in
ons as Strotz (1957), in his introduction of the notion of a utility tree and in
inter- his later (1959) discussion with Gorman, attempted to give more empir-
I par- ical content to the theory of consumer demand in precisely this way,
although he interpreted his results in terms of a "budgeting" process. An
ion to important aspect of the household production model, including time and
rmine market-purchasable goods, as introduced by Becker (1965), Lancaster
result (1966), and Muth (1966), is precisely, as Muth points out, that it does
nized yield "a utility function which is weakly separable when viewed as a
ption function of commodities purchased on the market" (Muth 1966, p. 700).
)ital? While itis true, in a sense, that many conclusions of the "new home
etical economics" could be derived directly from Strotzian utility trees and other
)del" specializing assumptions, the home-production aspect of the Chicago
function lends an intuitive insight and empirical content which are
I key lacking in the more abstract formulation. It suggests a more direct look
corn- at the technology of processes within the household and particularly at
eco- how such processes use household time and nonpurchased inputs in
er of additionto market-purchasable commodities. Indeed, the supposed
hold differences in the time intensity of the production of household goods give
this much of the content to recent applications of the "new home economics"
key to the problems of fertility and human capital formation.2 I return to this
ypes point irs Section 3 where! speculate on how the increasing value of human
s of time works through a Chicago utility function/household-production
ade model to alter the behavior of generations through time.
and A second key characteristic of the Chicago utility function is that it is
i of just that: one utility function—the welfare of the children and other
.ity, members of the family is assumed to enter the utility function of a single
ons decision maker (not always the husband and father!), thus obviating the
assumption of a "family utility function" with all the concomitant
:ds,
ies 2 Unfortunately, to date relatively little attention has been paid to the implications of
the household production model for the more general composition of consumption. Time
and market-purchasable-commodity intensities do differ greatly for different types of
uld consumption (e.g., drinking beer or going to a concert), and the new home economics
10 has implications going beyond fertility and human capital formation (see, however,
Michael [1972]).I
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problems of social utility functions in general. It is perhaps not entirely of
accurate to identify this position too closely with Chicago; it should function
perhaps be called the "Samuelsonian finesse." Samuelson (1956) writes: in some
Where the family is concerned the phenomenon of altruism
inevitably raises its head: if we can speak at all of the indifference
curves of any one member, we must admit that his tastes and
marginal rates of contribution are contaminated by the goods
that other members consume. These...externalconsumption
effects are the essence of family life.... Suchproblems of home
economics are, abstractly conceived, exactly of the same logical
character as the general problem of government and social
welfare. [P. 9]
if within the family there can be assumed to take place an
optimal reallocation of income so as to keep each member's
dollar expenditure of equal ethical worth, then there can be
derived for the whole family a set of well-behaved indifference Even
contours relating the totals of what it consumes: the family which
can be said to actasitmaximizes such a group preference
function. [P. 21] human
cribed
The problem with the Samuelsonian finesse, however, is that it assumes implio
a fixed family membership, and a great deal of what the Chicago utility ever, ii
function is designed to explain is how that family composition gets hand,
determined. This requires much more than Samuelson allows for in his functic
formulation. When, for example, are children members of the family, deterri
and thus codeterminers of the utility function, and when are they just Essent
arguments in the utility function determined for the family not including dynan
them? The full internalization argued by T. W. Schultz (1972b) seems a of a
necessary addition to the argument. Yet, for this to be true, what might be issue
called the "John Donne effect" must be extremely powerful. Casual with
observation suggests that each individual's concern for others diminishes a fort
with distance in both time and space. Yet it may be true under certain mighi
restrictive assumptions, as pointed out to me by Assaf Razin, that what remai
might be called pairwise intergenerational internalization (by which I or at
mean full internalization of the utilities of the next succeeding generation proce
by the immediately preceding generation) would lead to essentially the is the
same type of problem as that encountered in the discussions of optimal distin
growth with an infinite horizon. If a I
Morishima (1970, pp. 2 13—25) presents an extended discussion of some OWfl I
of the more technical issues involved in formulating dynamic utility
functions and the conditions under which such functions can be reduced
to the sum of discounted utilities of each future generation or at each
future point in time, irrespective of the generation involved. In general,
these conditions are highly restrictive and closely related to the conditions houseONOMY HOUSEHOLD AND ECONOMY S2o5
ntirely of Strotz (1959) and Gorman (1959) for strong separability of the utility
thould function. But as Koopmans (1967, P. 96) points out, the problem is really
in some sense an ethical one:
tru What is at issue is clearly an intertemporal distribution problem:
that of balancing the consumption levels of successive gener-
; ations, and of successive stages in the life-cycle of a given cohort
goods of contemporaries. The most pertinent decisions—individual,
Iption corporate, or governmental—are those that determine invest-
home ment in physical capital, i,n human capital, and in research
ogical and development. Investments in physical capital, if well made,
social augment future consumption through an increase in future
capital-labor ratios. Investment in human capital raises the
quality of labor and, one hopes, of life. Successful research and
ce an development augment future capital and labor inputs through
iber's the development of better techniques of production.
Lfl be
rence Even regarded as a strictly behavioral model, pairwise internalization,
tmily which seems central to the Chicago utility function, has most important
implications for the intergenerational transfers of material wealth and
human capital which Knight (1921, pp. 374—75) has so eloquently des-
cribed as central to the continuity of the social order.3 Some of these
umes implications bear on the issues discussed in the next section. Here, how-
tility ever, it seems essential to point out the profound problem in, on the one
gets hand, internalizing all the family members' satisfactions in one utility
ri his function and, at the same time, using this same utility function to
nily, determine the number and "quality" of the family members themselves.
just Essentially the problem results from the condensation of a sequential,
ding dynamic set of decisions into a theory of choice based on the maximization
a of a single, static, timeless utility function. In its most extreme form, the
tt be issue of the conceptual adequacy of the approach arises in connection
sual with the application of the new home economics to household formation—
shes a formation which in an earlier, less aberrant, and nonconformist era
tam might have been described as "marriage"! Yet marriage, in some sense,
'hat remains very much associated with procreation; and the act of marriage,
:hI or at least of household formation, is the normal first step in the central
lion process of choice with which the new home economics deals. Where then
the is the utility function? Can the entire process really be separated into two
rial distinct parts, what the econometrician would call a recursive system?
If a fundamental purpose of marriage is the procreation of a couple's
me own legitimate children, given a society's definition of both marriage and
lity
:ed Indeed, there is good reason to suppose that the reason for many institutions of
ich society is precisely to ensure that the interests of future generations will be adequately
a1 guarded by the present. A meaningful theory of intergenerational welfare comparisons
has not yet been developed, but such a theory is surely central to our understanding of
household decision making and its consequences.
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legitimacy, clearly the process cannot be regarded as recursive.4 Again,
the static character of the analysis, while not necessarily limiting its
usefulness in an empirical sense, introduces a conceptual difficulty of a
high order.
The second element in the new home economics is the technology of
household production described by a production function or functions
and a list of the resources utilized in the processes involved. Typically,
following Becker (1965), the inputs are time, perhaps distinguishable by
household member (e.g., husband and wife) and market-purchasable
commodities. These inputs are used to produce within the household
the goods and services that in turn lead to satisfaction. In the simplest
form in the economic theory of fertility, two time inputs (the husband's
and wife's) and one general market-purchasable commodity are assumed
in the household technology to produce three household goods: child
numbers, child quality, and a general commodity called "other satis-
factions" (Willis 1973; DeTray 1973). In all analyses to date an important
further simplification of this basic technological structure has been made:
each good entering the utility function is assumed to be produced by a
separate independent production process. Jointness in production arises
not because of common overhead factors within the household, but
because the factor inputs available to the household are subject to overall
constraints.5 Willis (1973) and DeTray (1973), for example, both assume
that child quality per child and child numbers are produced by inde-
pendent production processes. Each factor separately enters the household
utility function in the Willis formulation. The one is simply multiplied
with the other to arrive at the final good, child services, which is assumed
to enter the household utility function in DeTray's formulation. Both
child numbers and child quality are generally assumed to be mother's
time-intensive.
This formulation also neglects the sequential and essentially dynamic










































Still, it may be helpful analytically to tackle the problem in a stepwise fashion (see
Becker 1973). In part of his work, Becker does consider the division of the gains from
marriage, the most important gains being the children, and this is, of course, a matter
closely related to the utility function maximized within the marriage.
A partial exception is the work of Michael Grossman (1971; 1972, pp. 74—79). In
his analysis Grossman does assume separate production processes but stipulates that the
entire amounts of certain factors available to the household must enter each production
function as one of its arguments. That is to say, in the standard analysis, if one could
separately identify the amount of one factor—say, wife's time—used irs a particular
activity, one could measure the effect of a unit increase in that input on the output of
that activity independently of the overall resource constraint on the wife's time to the
household, whereas in Grossman's formulation the overhead factor, say, the family house,
cannot in principle be allocated among the activities but must enter fully into each one.
Grossman's work, however, still does lack generality in the respect discussed above,
since complementarity among final goods cannot be encompassed in his formulation
except through the rather Ptolemaic device of introducing some of the final outputs as
inputs in the production processes of some of the other outputs.CONOMY HOUSEHOLD AND ECONOMY S2o7
Again, that in many societies and families, the eldest son is often the beneficiary
ting its of the bulk of the investment in the human capital that takes place in the
Ityofa second generation. Indeed, Sloan's recent work (1971, pp. 3 1—32) suggests
that in poor countries the sex, as well as birth order of a child, may be an
logy of important determinant of the infant's survival probabilities, presumably
because of the differential investments in health and nutrition that take
?lcally, place within the family rather than for purely genetic reasons.
ible by The restrictiveness of the rather special assumption of separability of
sasable productive activities has not been apparent in the basically two-good
Isehold (child services/other satisfactions) static models usually considered, for
mplest what is ruled out is complementarity among different outputs in a multi-
band's product context. As is well known, under conditions of variable propor-
Sumed dons, complementarity (in the sense that the output of one good could be
child increased without decreasing the output of the other good and without
satis- using additional resources) cannot occur if the production unit, in this
Ortant case the household, is at an optimum and using resources fully. In a
nade: three-or-more-product case, however, itis possible for several of the
• by a outputs to be complementary with each other, although substitutable
arises jointly against the rest (Hicks 1939, p. 92).6 In the latter case, holding
but available resources constant, increasing the level of one of the outputs
verall optimally might well involve also increasing another, although clearly a
;sume third output level would have to be decreased. One can easily see how
inde- restrictive the elimination of complementarity could be in a context
involving several dimensions of child quality, for example, health and
plied physical development and intellectual achievement. In a dynamic con-
imed text such potential complementarities are of even greater significance
Both since there is, for example, some evidence that early underinvestment in
her s nutritional capital may substantially affect the productivity of later
investments in intellectual human capital (Berg 1973, pp.
snuc The third element in the new home economics is a set of assumptions
about the way in which household resources, principally time, can be
transformed into market-purchasable commodities to be used in the
(see household production process. Strictly speaking, I suppose one could
at consider this set of assumptions as part of the general technology of house-
hold production and subsumed under the second element of the theory.
It is, however, better to treat the matter separately, since most of what is
tion involved concerns the terms upon which household members can enter
ould the labor market, the wages they can earn, and, somewhat secondarily,
the prices at which market commodities can be purchased. It is here that
tiH the lack of dynamic character of the new home economics cuts most
iDe. 6InHick's substitute the word "outputs" for "facton" and vice versa, and
hold the factor of production (his "output") fixed.
It would seem more straightforward and perhaps more desirable in future work to
deal with simple forms of multiproduct production functions. For an empirical example,
see Eads, Nerlove, and Raduchel (1969).I
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deeply into its potential implications for the central problems of fertility volumi
and female labor-force participation. The timing and spacing of children, is pass4
the opportunities for part-time work and accumulation of lifetime labor age. 'I
market experience, and choices as to the amount of education to be
invested in early in the life cycle all revolve heavily on the terms under investS
which women can participate in the labor market and thus share in the later
transformation of the household's time resources into market commodities. The
The human capital literature (Ben-Porath 1967; Mincer 1970, 1973) is, of cots
of course, replete with dynamic analyses of investment in human capital with
over time and the life-cycle effects of these investments on earnings. But from t
little of this work has entered the more general framework of the "new it is
home economics," particularly as this theory bears on decisions concerning figure
the numbers of children and their timing and spacing within a marriage
and the relation of these decisions to the accumulation of other forms of
assets. The work of Heckman (1971), Ghez and Becker (1972), and un-
published work of Frank Stafford does, however, represent a notable
beginning of the extension of this part of theory into more dynamically
relevant realms.8 Yet we need to understand far more than we presently
do about why the labor market functions so differently for men than for
women, the role of institutional constraints, discrimination, and the
relation of these to women's choices of occupation and timing of labor-force
participation. Once again, the simultaneities of the system severely
limit our ability to break out a single segment for proper analysis.
The fourth and final element in the new home economics is the resource
constraints facing the household inits production and optimization
decisions. Traditionally these constraints are divided into time (husband's
and wife's, although often the husband is assumed to devote full time to
the market) and "other" nonwage income. While it is universally recog-
nized that some elements of household production and consumption—
sleep and food, for example—are in fact inputs into the production-of-
time resources, little attention has thus far been paid to the quality of the
time resources and of other family resources—both genetic and material— sc
passed from one generation to the next. Arleen Leibowitz's study of othe
Terman's 1921 sample of California school children, reported in this and
conS
8Muchrecent work, however, is dynamic only in the relatively trivial sense of in-
volving maximization over a number of periods of time without uncertainty concerning
the values of future values of exogenous constraints to future decisions. This is the sense
in which a dynamic programming problem can be turned into an ordinary programming froiu
problem of much larger dimensions; apart from the computational difficulties thus are I
introduced, the chief defect of this approach is that it fails to lay bare the sequential be e
nature of the decision-making process in the way, for example, in which the recursive of wi
solution to the general dynamic programming problem of Bellman does. In the absence of u4
of uncertainty, however, nothing essential is lost by the straightforward multiperiod ariaS
extension of the basically static framework. When values of future constraints are un- the
certain, then it does become essential to understand and incorporate the sequential taStS
character of the decision process (see Nerlove l972a). So far this has not been done in the gene
literature of the new home economics. OVCIHOUSEHOLD AND ECONOMY S2o9
volume, bears importantly on the manner in which much human capital
.ldren, is passed from one generation to another, especially to a child of preschool
labor age. The sample is very unrepresentative, but it is instructive, for the
to be investments in her child of a mother's time and the quality of those
under investments, as measured by her education, are found to affect appreciably
in the later measures of the child's ability and future earning capacity.
ditjes. The resource constraints facing the household, once it is formed, are,
73) is, of course, a product of the household formation itself and thus connected
apital with my earlier remarks on the inseparability of this complex of issues,
But from those of family choice and decision making. But, more important
"new it is in this area that the complex issue of intergenerational transfers
rning figures most prominently. We live, after all,
Tiage
ms of in a world where individuals are born naked, destitute, helpless,
ignorant, and untrained, and must spend a third of their lives
table in acquiring the prerequisites of a free contractual existence.
ically The fundamental fact about society as a going concern is that
ently it is made up of individuals who are born and die and give place
n for to others; and the fundamental fact about modern civilization
Ithe is that it is dependent upon the utilization of three great accu-
force mulating funds of inheritance from the past, material goods and
erely appliances, knowledge and skill, and morale. Besides the torch
of life itself, the material wealth of the world, a technological
'urce system of vast and increasing intricacy and the habituations
stion which fit men for social life must in some manner be carried
md's forward to new individuals born devoid of all these things as
le to older individuals pass out. The existing order, with the insti-
cog- tutions of the private family and private property (in self as well
)fl as goods), inheritance and bequest and parental responsibility,
i-of- affords one way for securing more or less tolerable results in
the grappling with this problem. [Knight 1921, pp. 374—75]
al—
vof So the apparently simple theoretical construct of a time budget plus
this other income constraint to the household conceals beneath its serene
and mathematically differentiable exterior the central problem of the
in- continuity of society itself.9
ning
ense Closely connected to the matter of what is inherited from the past and transferred
rung from generation to generation is the problem of how individual tastes and preferences
thus are formed and how they may change over time. I have not mentioned this issue lest I
itial be excommunicated from the economics profession! It is virtually part of the definition
sive of what an economist is that he takes tastes as given, and I sometimes suspect that many
liCe of us require all tastes to be identical and assume that all differences among individuals
nod arise from differences in the resource constraints those individuals face. Indeed, one of
Un- the consequences of the conjectures and speculations presented in Section 3 is that the
tial tastes and preferences of at least different generations, if not of individuals within each
the generation, could remain constant while the number of children per family declined
over time due to changes in the value of human time induced endogenously.1
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By themselves the four main elements of the theoretical structure of the by the
new home econom.ics—( I) a utility function with arguments which are ments
not physical commodities but home-produced bundles of attributes; the
(2) a household production technology; (3) an external labor-market fractio
environment providing the means for transforming household resources
into market commodities; and (4) a set of household resource constraints— the
are incapable of yielding a series of well-defined implications about the analys
main problems of household behavior with which we are concerned. It is than-a
only a framework within which to think about these problems. Many highei
special additional assumptions, some of which have been mentioned, that u
mustbe added to the framework to arrive at empirically refutable taste
propositions. Moreover, the nature of the required additional specific- genen
ations is intimately related to the peculiarities of the particular bodies of oppos
data to which the new home economics has been applied. These data where
range all the way from aggregate time-series data covering long periods reflect
of time, to cross-sectional census data for both large and small geographic of
regions at a point in time and over time, to household and family data certai
based on individual interviews, with and without collection of retrospec- of sch
tive information, less
If to the key simplification involved in the assumption of separable achie
independent productive processes within the household, one adds the assoc
assumptions that young children are highly intensive of the mother's
t and:
time in comparison with other activities within the home and older one
children are less intensive, and that for institutional or biological reasons meal
the comparative advantage of the male partner in the acquisition of educ
market-purchasable commodities significantly exceeds that of the female acrot
partner, a number of interesting implications of the theory emerge which and•
are tolerably well supported by the empirical evidence so far analyzed. p. SI
Setting aside for the moment the inadequacy of the observed market wage Ti
to measure the cost of a nonworking woman's time, the immediate horn
implication of the theory is that a rise in cost of mother's time for the econ
family will cause a substitution away from time-intensive goods such as WOTI
children and toward those requiring more inputs of market-purchasable Typ
commodities. Indeed, if we further assume momentarily that males are age
completely specialized in market activities, changes intheir wages fore
represent pure income effects for the family, and we do then observe for inte
families with working mothers positive association of family size with vah
income and negative association with female wage rates. To the extent and
that education serves as a proxy for the relative costs of time which may the
measure some of these costs less imperfectly, or at least in a fashion different exai
from market wages, similar differences are observed between the effects POS
of male and female educational attainments (Mincer 1963; Nerlove and hig
Schultz 1970; Willis 1973, DeTray 1973; Ben-Porath 1973). lab
The interpretation of many of the results is somewhat complicated wit
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of the by the effects of marriage on the association of the educational attain-
ch are ments of husbands and wives, and by the fact that wives and mothers for
butes. the most part specialize entirely in home activities during only varying
narket fractions of their lifetimes. Moreover, the effects of female education seem
Ources unexpectedly and puzzlingly nonlinear (Ben-Porath 1973). To illustrate
ints— the nature of the difficulty involved, consider the following simple
Ut the analysis of the effects of assortative mating. We know that men of higher-
t. it is than-average levels of education-al attainment tend to marry women of
higher-than-average levels of educational attainment. Suppose, however,
:oned, that tastes for children differ among the population; women with a high
'table taste for children and a low taste for market-related activities will tend in
general to seek and to receive less formal schooling than women with the
lies of opposite preference. Presumably a man's taste for children in a society
data where nearly all men specialize in market-related activities will not be
reflected very greatly in his formal schooling. Some effect of the amount
iphic of his formal schooling may occur through early marriage, but he will
data certainly seek a mate with like preferences. Thus, men with a given level
spec- of schooling with a high taste for children will tend to marry women with
less schooling than the average associated with the level these men have
cable achieved.If,asis common, a husband's educational attainment is
the associated primarily with permanent income effects within the household,
her's and his wife's is associated primarily with the opportunity cost of time,
)lder one can see that the negative effect of the opportunity cost of time as
measured this way on fertility will tend to be exaggerated, holding male
n of educational attainment constant, since the difference between the two
nale across couples partly reflects differences in tastes which are unobservable
hich and not included in the statistical analysis (see also T. W. Schultz [1973b,
zed. p. S8] for a related comment).
'age Turning the analysis around, we can ask what implications the new
iate home economics has for female labor-force participation. The new home
the economics predicts what is perhaps the obvious: the composition of a
i as woman's family is strongly associated with her labor-force participation.
Typically, the number of a family's children under the age of 18 and the
are age of the youngest child are both strong predictors of a woman's labor-
ges force participation. These facts about family composition have been
for interpreted by Cain (1966), for example, as measures of the opportunity
ith value of a mother's time in the home. Gronau (1973) attempted a detailed
and sophisticated analysis of just this proposition, using a subsample of
tay the1/1000 sample from 1960 United States Census; moreover, he
examined the interaction of educational attainment with family corn-
CtS position. Others (Smith 1972; Leibowitz 1972) have documented that
rid highly educated married women participate to a greater extent in the
labor force and work more hours when they do work than married women
with less schooling. Married women as a group also tend to withdraw1
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from the labor force when they have children; this is an implication of 3.
the new home economics, on the assumption that children are more Sp
female time—intensive than other commodities produced within the
home; but the rates at which women with different educational attain-
ments withdraw is not the same. During the child-rearing years, more
highly educated women reallocate more hours to household production
than do women with less education. Ben-Porath's (1973) finding of a
U-shaped relation between education and labor-force participation for In
Israeli women with young children strongly suggests differences in the Knigli
effects of education at different levels on the relative efficiencies of home to all
and market production and also interactions between female education will
and child quality. But all of this has been insufficiently explored within as did
the presently existing framework of the new home economics. As Sweet that
(1968), Nerlove and Schultz (1970), and Hall (1973) have emphasized, impoi
educational investments, labor-force participation, and fertility must be Aitho
viewed, at least partly, as simultaneously determined choices. This is returj
surely one of the most important implications of the new home economics any a
and only partly negated by the latter's currently static character. of rel
Finally, if we regard, as I think we must, the grand problem of the new returi
home economics as the explanation of the demographic transition, that is, level.
the "economic and social processes and family behavior that accounts for
the marked decline from very high birth and death rates to modern very Wi
low birth and death rates" (T. W. Schultz 1973b, p. S4), the new home inve5
economics does have some insights, albeit limited, to offer (O'Hara 1972). capil
Clearly, a high probability of child mortality affects the costs of achieving and
a given family size, that is, the number of children surviving to a given capil
age. If it is assumed that on the whole parents achieve a greater (dis- been
counted) sum of satisfactions the longer a child survives and if declines in (196
mortality result in greater relative increases in the conditional probabil- capi
ities of survival from earlier ages to successively older ages, declines in 18
mortality should tend, according to the new home economics, to generate pere
a greater demand for children. This need not lead to an increase in
births, however, since such declines in mortality lower the cost of child foru
quality relative to the cost of numbers of children. Of course, the net effect earl
must depend on the technology of the production of child numbers and fron
child quality as well as on the relative importance of these in the utility Wei
function. These factors, of course, may vary substantially from time to lab4
time, culture to culture, and place to place. The elucidation of such effects, PCI,
however, must surely constitute one of the central challenges to the tiOfl
empirical application of the new home economics. To explore such effects
fully, however, requires that the household decision-making process be eco
accommodated in a model of economic growth and development, a at I
subject to which we now turn. ThHOUSEHOLD AND ECONOMY S2 13
ion of 3.Household Decision Making and Economic Growth:
more Speculations and Conjectures
the "Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from
ttain- here?"
more "That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,"
tCtion said the Cat. [Alice's Adventures in Wonderland]
of a
n for In his classic paper on "Diminishing Returns from Investment,"
i the Knight (1944) pointed out that "if new investment can be freely directed
to all uses, i.e., embodied in all types of productive agents indifferently, it
ation will not be subject to diminishing returns" (p. 33). Moreover, he stressed,
ithiri as did Marshall before him, the concepj of capital in human beings, and
weet that "in the production of laborers the matter of 'quality' is far more
ized, important than that of quantity in the crude sense of numbers" (p. 35).
;t be Although investment "freely directed" might not be subject to diminishing
is is returns, certainly, under static circumstances, continued investment in
mics any one particular direction ought eventually to result in a declining rate
of return. Yet, as T. W. Schultz (1973b) has emphasized, the rate of
new return appears to have diminished little, if at all, in response to a high
Ltis, level and even accelerated pace of investment in human capital, and,
for indeed, it may have actually risen (T. W. Schultz 1971, p. 173).
iery We do not, of course, have any really accurate measure of the extent of
me investment in human capital as compared with investment in nonhuman
72). capital and in the stock of knowledge through investment in research
'ing and development. Yet, there are a number of clues which suggest that the
yen capital stock invested in human beings, even on a per capita basis, has
dis- been a steadily growing portion of the total capital stock. T. W. Schultz
in (1961, p. 73) suggests a rise of the value of the stock of educational human
bil- capital embodied in the stock of labor of persons age 14 and older from
in 18 percent in 1900 of the total educational and physical capital to 30
ate percent in 1957. These estimates do not include on-the-job training or
investments in better health and nutrition. In terms of gross capital
ild formation, Kuznets (1966, p. 243) calculates, on the basis of Schultz's
earlier work, a rise in the share of investments in formal education alone
rid from "about 9% in 1900 to over 38% in the 1950s." Moreover, for
.ty Western countries as a whole, Kuznets (1971) calculates the share of
to labor has risen from 55 to 75 percent of national income over the same
ts, period. These facts, meager as they may be, suggest two significant ques-
tions which are germane to the issue with which this paper began, namely,
:ts how can the new home economics be integrated into a general theory of
economic growth and development in a manner which has some hope,
a at least, of bearing on the grand question of the demographic transition?
These two questions are the following.S2 I 4 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
First, what accounts for the failure of the rate of return to investments
in human capital, even counting educational investments, to fall, despite
a high and accelerating rate of investment in this form of capital relative
to other forms? In other words, why does there appear to be a persistent
disequilibrium among these rates of return?
Second, quite apart from the possibility of disequilibrium rates of
return (even if they are in equilibrium), what effect will increasing human
capital investment per capita have on the allocation of resources within
the household and what, if any, repercussions will it have for the rate of
growth of population and labor force? A number of speculations and
conjectures on the answers to these questions follow; they emphasize
the role of the increasing value time over time and its relation,
which is reciprocal, to the increasing level of investment in human
beings.
Razin (1969, 1972) showed how, under certain circumstances, the ratio
of human to total capital per capita would increase along the optimal
growth path of an economy experiencing technical progress. As indicated
earlier, T. W. Schultz has emphasized this aspect of the persistant failure
of rates of return to investments in human capital to decline. The demand
for skills and knowledge embodied in human capital does not decline
because of additional investments in the stock of useful knowledge and
technique (technological change) which require the continual adaptation
and adjustment of the human agent to utilize efficiently this augmented
stock and seek out the new sources of investment opportunities which
maintain the growth process. But even in the absence of a persistent
disequilibrium created by the demand for human capital, it is possible
that the rates of return to such investments would fail to fall over time, or
fall only slowly, in relation to the rates of return to other forms of in-
vestment because of endogenously changing relative cost of investment,
that is, changes on the supply side.
One of the most important consequences of the growing "quality" of
human beings as reflected in the increased stock of human capital per
capita, as pointed out by T. W. Schultz (1973b), is the increasing value
of human time per unit of such time. Many of the consequences of the
increasing value of time over time are amusingly explored by Linder
(1970) in his penetrating study of The Harried Leisure Class. Yet Linder
and Schultz fail to note the important link which may exist between the
increasing value of human time, due presumably to investment in human
capital as well as to investment in other forms of capital and in technologi-
cal change, and the terms on which investment in human capital takes
place. If one assumes, as I think plausible, that children (as regards both
quality and quantity) are time-intensive as compared with other goods
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merits of human capital increases the marginal productivity of a unit of time in
the care and rearing of children within the home in an offsetting fashion,
increases in the value of time will lead to a shift away from children to
istent less time-intensive activities. To be sure, such a substitution effect may be
offset by a strong income effect, but there are still further grounds to
tes of suppose that both substitution and income effects will tend to lead to an
uman increase in child quality rather than child numbers.
In a recent note (1973), Becker and Lewis explored the consequences
ate of of a simple model of the relation between the quality and quantity of a
and good (in this case, children) entering the utility function, under the
Lasize assumption that quality per unit is the same for all units. Increases in
Itior*, either quantity or quality cause the shadow prices of the other to rise
Iman and if, as is plausible, the income elasticity for quality is greater than that
for quantity, the resulting increase in the shadow price of numbers would
ratio reduce the apparent income elasticity for quantity, perhaps even to
imal negative level. Thus, the income effect of the increasing value of human
;ated time should, under these circumstances, lead to a substitution of quality
iltJre for quantity of children, in addition to leading to a substitution away
Land from children altogether to less time-intensive goods. This rests of course,
on the premise that the productivity of time in rearing children is un-
and changed or, at least, not greatly increased. Moreover, the pure price
.tion effects are likely to work in the same direction, since it is plausible that
quantity is more time-intensive than quality of children per unit of equal
quality time and that, indeed, the shadow price of quality is likely to be
tent reduced by increases in the quality of the mother's time input (I refer
ible again to Arleen Leibowitz's paper in this volume).
OR. The investments in child quality referred to earlier take two major
in- forms: (1) sound nutrition and health care, and (2) education, skills, or
tnt, attitudes conducive to acquisition of further education and skills.
Good nutrition and health care increase youngsters' chances of survival
of and may also affect their ability to absorb future investments in intellectual
per capital. To the extent that such investments increase the life span, par-
lue ticularly the span of years over which a person can be economically
:he active, such an increase in quality will raise the return to investments in
ler human capital which sons and daughters may later wish to make in
Ler themselves. To the extent that better health and nutrition result in a
he reduction in child mortality, they increase the satisfactions accruing to
an parents from other forms of investment which also raise child quality,
for the to these investments may then be expected to be enjoyed
es over a longer period of time on average. Increases in longevity, particularly
th of an individual's economically productive years, increase the amount of
1S human time available without increasing population; such an increase
It would tend by itself to lower the value of time per unit, but, as we know,S216 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY HOUSEI
most of the effects of better health care and nutrition occur in childhood per ca
and enhance the quality of a unit of time in later years more than in- qualiti
creasing the number of children. On net balance, therefore, I would and p;
conjecture that better health and nutrition lower the costs of further in- favor i
vestments in human capital relative to those in other fornis of capital and of this
increase the returns therefrom. in
The second main form which an increase in child quality may take is, indica
as I have stated, through investment in the form of education, skills, or begins
attitudes conducive to later acquisition of further education or skills. Thi
Much investment in human capital of this type tends to be time-intensive dimly
in the preschool years,lthough the productivity of a unit of a mother's the va
time, as remarked, may be especially enhanced by a greater stock of and i
humancapital embodied in her, so it is not necessarily true that over time, elimii
as the result of the increasing value of human time, substitution will tend ledge
to occur away from this form of investment. Nonetheless, it is in this area house
that we might expect some induced "technological innovations" which of
could economize on a scarce time. Nursery schools, day-care
centers, and the proliferation of "educational" toys are perhaps examples. in la
On the whole, then, I think we may conclude that increases in quality of yearl
children relative to their numbers take the form of investments in human unit
capital which ultimately have the effect of raising the value of time per
unit in the economically active years of adulthood.
For reasons which I feel certain we do not fully understand, but which
are due in part to the presence of children's utilities in the utility function as
of the family to which they belong, parents do desire to bequeath a stock per
of capital to their children. Since the stock of capital, material and crea
intangible, human and nonhuman, is growing per capita in Western heir
economies, one must assume that parents desire to pass along more than chil
that which they received from their parents, or that institutions in the
economy function in such a way as to induce this outcome. Irrespective ove
of the motivation, however, the increasing value of human time must rati
havean effect on the form in which this capital is passed on. As long as rat'
rates of return to investments in human capital remain above, or fall ma
more slowly than, the rates of return to investments in other forms of
capital, parents will be induced to bequeath a greater part in the form of tra
human capital. Thus, the tendency toward increasing quality of children mc
will be intensified by the bequest motive, despite the opposite tendency, aic
resulting from the increasing cost of time, to invest in bequests which are be
less time-intensive. But as rates of return tend to equality over time—if
they ever do—parents should tend to bequeath less in the form of human r&
capital and more in the form of financial and physical capital. Nonethe- wi
less, as long as investment in human capital occurs, the value of a unit of irs
human time will continue to rise with increases in the stock of capital VINOMY HOUSEHOLD AND ECONOMY S2 17
hood per capita, reinforcing the tendency to fewer children of ever-higher
in- quality. Substitution will occur in favor of fewer children of higher quality
and perhaps eventually against both quality and quantity of children in
in- favor of commodities and knowledge. The "facts" cited at the beginning
I and of this section, suggesting an increasing portion of total capital formation
in this century has occurred in the form of human capital, however,
ke is, indicate that we may be far from the point at which such substitution
IS, or begins to take place against children, quality, and quantity combined.
kills. The outlines of a revised Maithusian model begin to emerge, albeit
rulve dimly, from the foregoing conjectures and speculations. In this model,
her S the value of human time and changes in that value over time are pivotal,
Ic of and the limitations imposed by natural resources are mitigated, if not
ime, eliminated, by technological progress and increases in the stock of know-
tend ledge and of capital, both human and nonhuman. The main link between
area household and economy is the value of human time; the increased value
hich of human time results in fewer children per household, with each child
care embodying greater investments in human capital which in turn result
)Ies. in lower mortality and greater productivity in the economically active
of years. Such greater productivity in turn further raises both the value of a
nan unit of time and income in the subsequent generation and enables
per persons of that generation to make efficient use of new knowledge and new
• physical capital. Eventually, rates of return to investments in physical
iich capital, new knowledge, and human capital may begin to equalize, but
iOn as long as investment occurs which increases the amount of human capital
per individual, the value of a unit of human time must continue to in-
in
crease.It is not possible to say whether the diminishing ability of a human
em being to absorb such investment would eventually stabilize the number of
children per household and at what level, given the satisfactions parents
e obtain from numbers of children as well as their quality. Nonetheless,
ive over time the model does predict in rough qualitative fashion declining
U5t rates of population growth (perhaps eventually zero rates or even negative
rates for a time) and declining rates of infant mortality. These are the
f
main features of the demographic transition.
f Much remains to be done if this rough and speculative outline is to be
0 translated into a true integration of the new home economics with the
modern theory of economic growth, particularly as the former evolves
along more dynamic and empirically relevant lines. First, the model must
be mathematized—and it is clear that there are many forms in which this
may be accomplished—so that the crucial parameters and behavioral
relations may be isolated. These must then be studied empirically, for
f without quantitative knowledge of the parameters and technologies
involved and the key behavioral relations the course of the important
variables over time cannot be predicted or compared with past behavior.I
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The role of the growth theorist is apparent in the first of these tasks and Cc
thoseof the econometrician and economic historian in the second. Finally,
the conceptual foundations of the new home economics, particularly with
respect to intergenerational transfers, must be clarified if we are to
understand the extent to which actual growth departs from the optimal
path, the reasons for such departure, and whether collective action is
either desirable or necessary to correct such departures.
I hope this paper represents at least a modest beginning in showing
where it is we want to get to, if not a set of directions on which way we Zv
































I shall divide my comments into two parts, corresponding to Nerlove's
discussion of the "new home economics" and the stylized "facts" that
appear to be building blocks for a future growth model. I am very much
in agreement with Nerlove's exposition of the "new home economics,"
but I would like to amplify a bit two of his implied criticisms of the state
of this theory.
One of the major working assumptions of the theory is the existence of a
common family utility function. In his paper in this volume, Gary Becker
shows that by introducing the notion of "caring" (or the interdependence
of utilities) one can show that the family will behave as if it has a common
utility function. This will not do, I think, for the analysis of the empirical
phenomena that we are really interested in. What parents care for is not
the utility that their children receive, but the utility function that the
children have and the resources that they control. Parents care about the
consumption basket of their children; they have preferences over actual
actions, not just their subjective outcomes. Much of the within-family
conflict comes from different evaluations of the same consumption
opportunities. For example, since many families appear to subsidize their
children's higher education, and since the marginal valuation of family
funds may not be the same for different family members, it may pay for
the young both to pursue higher education further than appears warranted
on straight rate-of-return calculations (somebody else is paying the cost),
and to work less hard at it than the donors of the money would have liked
them to do. In any case, a common utility function cannot explain either
the growth of households or their dissolution, or indicate the point at
which it pays for the young to opt out of it. It is probably also not necessary
for the analysis of such questions, as is indicated by Becker's model of the
marriage market.
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The main shortcoming of the "new home economics" for the analysis '1
of fertility decisions is that it assumes too little. The basic postulates are the
that children are goods, that all goods are subject to two constraints— grci
time and money—and that children are relatively time-intensive goods. pei
But this does not distinguish children from hi-fl sets! Adding the observ- ma
ation that children tend to use mother's time more than father's does not ani
get us much further. Moreover, given the aims of the theory, this should wh
probably come out as a conclusion, rather than be assumed from the
beginning. In any case, the theory focuses on children as a good whose of
costs have a relatively high time component (particularly mother's time). of
Thus, any changes that have occurred have to be explained in terms of un
changes in total marginal cost (money and time) of this good (children) bo
relative to the cost of all other consumption goods. I do not think that this
is enough. The theory currently provides one explanation (among several of
competing ones) of the secular decline in fertility, attributing it to the gil
rising cost of time, but it fails to provide any convincing explanation for tit
the major fertility cycles that we have experienced. As the discussion at as
this conference made clear, we have no economic explanation yet within se
the framework of this theory either for the baby boom of the 1950s or the in
current rather sharp decline in fertility rd
My belief is that if we want to study the demand for children, we have
to put more content into the theory and start asking why do people want is
to have children; what are the returns and not just the costs of this activity?
In terms of the theoretical framework used in this volume, I am looking 12
for shifters of the utility function, or, alternatively, for factors that change a
the implicit household production function. If we are studying the demand U
for children rather than for hi-fl sets, we have to ask ourselves what it is
about children that distinguishes them from other time-intensive durable I'
goods. Perhaps we should go back to some low-level discussions about the a
"motives" for having children, along the lines of the discussion of the
demand for money in older textbooks. I would distinguish at least three
interdependent motives: (I) economic security (current labor and old-age 2
provisions), (2) the production of reciprocal caring, and (3) an attempt at
immortality via one's offspring.
The last motive explains the attempts to impose an image on the
children (an improved version of our own) and the interest in the actual
basket of consumption rather than just the summary state (utility) of their
well-being. The returns in terms of the first two motives have been
declining secularly, perhaps even faster than the rise in costs implied by the
cost-of-time hypothesis. It is my guess that part of the recent sharp decline
in fertility stems from the clear recognition on the part of the current
childbearing cohort of the relatively low rate of return experienced by
their own parents.
JCOMMENT S22I
.lysis Turning to the last part of Nerlove's paper, I want to take issue with
are the two stylized facts that appear to be empirical building blocks for his
growth model: the constancy of the rate of return to schooling and a
ods. persistent disequilibrium reflected in higher rates of return to the invest-
erv- ment in human as compared with physical capital. Both Finis Welch
not and I have to take some blame for popularizing the first "fact" at a time
)uld when it was beginning to cease being a "fact." The persistence of relatively
the high rates of return to schooling through the 1950s and l960s in the face
lose of rising schooling levels throughout the economy was probably the result
rie). of an accidental constellation of forces rather than the expression of an
s of underlying constancy in the economic mechanism. The higher education
en) boom was sustained by three forces: (1) the first round of cohorts to be
this educated after World War II was a relatively small and declining fraction
:ral of the population; (2) the post—World War II baby boom increased
the greatly the demand for teachers at all levels; and (3) at about the same
for time the government superimposed on all of this a space-defense-research-
at and-development boom, heavily human capital-intensive, resulting in a
scramble for young, educated talent. Unfortunately, these fortuitous
:he influences have run their course. The educational system has probably
reached its longer-run equilibrium level, if it has not overshot it. The
ye space research and development boom is over now, at a time when there
nt is, and will be for the next 5 years or so, an annual wave of an additional
y? one million highly educated workers arriving at the doors of the full-time
rig labor force. The rates of return to schooling have already started falling
and will probably fall quite a bit further before supply response catches
up with them.
is Also, I am not sure that I understand the disequilibrium discussion in
le Nerlove's paper. First, I know of no study that shows that relevant rates
of return, computed in comparable terms, are significantly higher for
schooling than for physical investment. The fact that human capital may
have been growing faster than physical is no evidence for this proposition,
and it does not require it.
e
r